The Commi>ee of 100 (C100) is pleased to present this important White Paper, "Prosecu)ng Chinese Spies: An Empirical Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act" by legal scholar Andrew C. Kim of South Texas College of Law, Houston. The study, which Kim developed over the course of a full year of research, offers an empirical analysis of recent U.S. government espionage claims brought against people of Asian heritage. C100 is publishing an execu)ve summary of Kim's report, along with two independent commentaries, to bring a>en)on to the study's findings, prior to its appearance in an academic version.
The study provides empirical indica)ons that Asian Americans, whether immigrant or na)ve-born, may be facing unfair and increasing racial prejudice in this era of geopoli)cal compe))on. C100 recognizes that these new risks are underscored by a legacy of almost two centuries of racial stereotyping as perpetual "foreigners," where the loyalty of Asian Americans to the United States has been repeatedly challenged with similar themes.
During World War II, despite evidence known at the )me that there was no genuine threat, 120,000 Japanese Americans -2/3 of them U.S. ci)zens -were sent to internment camps and incarcerated based solely on the suspicions that their ethnic heritage made them "enemy The history of Asian Americans dates back to the early nineteenth century, with numerous contribu)ons extraordinary and ordinary, in fields ranging from the sciences to the arts to technology and business. These FRANK H. WU CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE OF 100 contribu)ons have been made possible in a na)on that welcomes everyone. The rule of law promises equality without regard to race, color, or creed.
Yet from )me to )me, we fail to live up to our own ideals.
We have found evidence of depriva)ons of due process that affect innocent individuals. These prevent society from realizing the benefit of the full poten)al of Asian American contribu)ons. Not all suspected economic espionage spies are prosecuted under the EEA. For example, Dr. Xi Xiaoxing, who was falsely accused of stealing superconductor technology for China, was charged with wire fraud, a crime that usually does not involve espionage-type ac)vity. By focusing on EEA cases, however, this study was able to produce an unbiased sample of federal cases all of which include allega)ons of the thes of secret informa)on.
Tes)ng for racial dispari)es requires an indicator of the defendant's race, a variable that is absent from most PACER records. To work around this otherwise fatal complica)on, this study used the defendant's name as a proxy for race.
The sample includes 107 defendants with "Western" names, (defined to include those with Eastern European, Hispanic, and La)no names), 59 defendants with Chinese names, 17 defendants with other Asian names (including Indian names), and 4 defendants with Arabic names.
Searches on Google and Facebook were used to disambiguate any names with unclear na)onal origins.
Because this study could not iden)fy defendants' ci)zenship statuses, it cannot dis)nguish between the treatment of Asian-American ci)zens and na)onals of Asian countries. (2) Half of EEA cases alleged the\ of secrets for a USA en2ty, one third for China, and none for Russia
DATA
The intended beneficiary of the alleged espionage could be iden)fied in 118 out of the 136 cases in the sample. In half (48%) of cases, trade secrets were allegedly stolen to benefit an American en)ty. In one third (34%) of cases, the alleged thess were intended to benefit Chinese en))es.
The remaining cases involved na)ons as diverse as South Africa, India, Iran, and the Czech Republic. None of the cases in which an alleged beneficiary could be iden)fied involved Russia. Western names. Instead, these defendants were acqui>ed at trial, pled guilty only to "false statements" and released on proba)on, or, most osen, had all charges against them dropped. The fact that these defendants were never proven guilty of espionage does not necessarily mean they were innocent. Aser all, there are reasons other than innocence, such as suppression of key evidence, for why a prosecutor might drop all charges or allow a defendant to plead guilty to a minor offense like false statements. Nonetheless, these findings raise the possibility that as many as one in five accused Asian "spies" might actually be innocent, a rate that is twice as large as that for defendants with Western names.
Page 10 were unavailable to Professor Kim, this would mean that we might indeed be seeing not just unexplained disparity, but discrimina)on.
Second, consider the data indica)ng that twice as many cases against Chinese defendants result in acqui>als, guilty pleas to reduced charges, or dropped charges as is true of cases against non-Chinese defendants. Though these data are consistent with both innocent and troubling explana)ons, they deserve further scru)ny. This is because of the striking parallel with stop and frisk data gathered in New York over the last decade. In the Floyd v.
New York City case, which resulted in a federal court order to reform the use of stop and frisk prac)ces by the New York Police Department, an astonishing 88 percent of all stops yielded nothing -not an arrest, not a recovery of a gun or other contraband -not even a summons. Buried deeper in the data was this: police were more likely by far to stop African American and La)nos than whites, but much more likely to find contraband on, and make arrests of, whites than African Americans or La)nos.
This seeming contradic)on laid bare a hidden opera)onal standard -perhaps hidden even from officers themselves:
while the legal standard for stopping any person was the same -reasonable, fact-based suspicion of involvement in criminal ac)vity, according to the U.S. Supreme Court -the actual standard in use on the street seemed to be lower for African Americans and La)nos than for whites. In other words, African Americans and La)nos were seen as suspicious on much less evidence than were whites, resul)ng in stops that were "hits" -that is, they resulted in an arrest or a summons -much less osen than stops of whites, because officers did not stop whites un)l they had more, and more solid, evidence of criminality. The same kind of process may be at work here: while there may be innocent explana)ons for the disparity, it may be that inves)gators and prosecutors are more willing to go forward with cases against Chinese and Asian defendants on less evidence than they are in inves)ga)ons of whites.
Because we have seen precedent for this in very different kinds of law enforcement ac)vity, this is something to inves)gate more deeply in exis)ng cases in the data, and to track carefully going forward.
For all these reasons, Professor Kim's study does a real service. He points to an issue many perceive to exist in the real world, and marshals the data to examine it. While that data remains too scarce to draw defini)ve conclusions, he correctly points out that the data do raise serious ques)ons.
As we transi)on into a new presiden)al administra)on, with a new team atop the Department of Jus)ce, these ques)ons cannot -they must not be -ignored.
Our federal criminal jus)ce system is relentlessly efficient.
Of the cases adjudicated each year, more than 97% are resolved by guilty plea, and 90% of the remainder end in guilty verdicts at trial. Less than 7% of charged cases are dismissed or deferred annually, and most of those through diversionary programs for low-level offenders. These sta)s)cs are due mainly to federal prosecutors' careful selec)on process (they decline as much as 63% of cases brought to them annually). With trials all but disappearing as an adjudica)ve mechanism, we trust these prosecutors - It's not that Chinese and Asian espionage is increasing, but rather that prosecutors believe it to be, and therefore, they may dispropor)onately and precipitously target individuals of Chinese and other Asian descent as spies, leading inevitably to a high rate of false posi)ves.
There is a growing empirical literature examining how implicit bias pervades our criminal jus)ce system, from the decision to stop and ques)on an individual, to the decision to arrest, to the decision to charge, to the type of charge to be levied, to the degree of leniency offered in plea bargaining, to the severity of sentencing. Most of this research -driven by the dispari)es in our convicted and incarcerated popula)ons, as well as studies of DNA exonera)on cases -focuses on differences in the experiences and outcomes of whites and African Americans.
Kim's research is a major contribu)on to this scholarship for two reasons. First, rela)vely li>le is known about implicit bias in our criminal jus)ce system beyond the studies rela)ng to biases against African Americans. By focusing on an ethnicity that is rarely the subject of such researchindeed, a group that is osen viewed as having overcome historical prejudices -Kim corroborates and deepens the exis)ng insights about implicit bias in the criminal jus)ce context, demonstra)ng the poten)al for bias in a range of less tradi)onal cases (beyond drugs and terrorism, for example) and among groups outside the tradi)onal blackwhite paradigm of racial jus)ce. In other words, implicit bias in a jus)ce system that prizes accuracy but He uncovered several cases where, for example, it was clear that charges were dismissed on innocence grounds, cases where risk of flight and destruc)on of evidence could not have been legi)mate concerns, and cases where there was a strong inference that a convic)on to a count of making a false statement did not indicate culpability for espionage.
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All of these findings strengthen the inevitable takeaway from the paper: it is likely that the charging, convic)on and sentencing dispari)es in economic espionage cases are driven by bias against Asians.
Kim concludes with some prac)cal calls for addi)onal ac)on, including implicit bias training for prosecutors, sugges)ons to slow the rush to indict, and, most notably, a requirement of transparent explana)ons for decisions to drop or significantly reduce charges. Prosecutorial discre)on powers the efficiency of our criminal jus)ce system, which, in the end, to borrow from Harold Lasswell, is all about who gets charged what, where and why. As the sta)s)cs cited at the beginning of this commentary establish, a charge is tantamount to a convic)on in most federal cases. Even without a convic)on, a charge alone is certainly personally devasta)ng to the individual involved. But apart from occasional high-profile examina)ons (the Ted Stevens case, for example), the opera)on of prosecutorial discre)on is largely a black box. Kim's project in fact grew out of unheeded calls to the DOJ for an independent inves)ga)on into its espionage prosecu)ons to address concerns about racial disparity. Were the prosecutors, however, required to explain publicly why they dismissed espionage charges, we would get a window into the factors that lead both to a prosecutorial rush to a judgment and the more painful but necessary process of redressing ini)al errors. By illustra)ng both the dangers of relying too heavily on the ini)al judgments of police and prosecutors and the mechanisms by which prosecutors can reassess these judgments, this data reveals the prosecutor as the minister for jus)ce that she must be (and is, for the most part), rather than just an advocate for convic)on at all cost. Moreover, the fact that any later decision to dismiss espionage charges -among the most challenging for anyone to face -will be scru)nized closely may promote greater prosecutorial accountability throughout the life of the case.
